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Aquinas on Being, by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp.
x and 212. $45.00.
BRIAN DAVIES, Fordham University
We say that certain things exist, or that they are beings as opposed to nonbeings. We say, for example, that there are mountains in Switzerland, or
that people are beings while chimeras are not. But we cannot plausibly
maintain that "There are mountains in Switzerland," or "John is a being,"
are descriptions of anything. " _ exist(s)" and " _ is a being," do not tell
us what something is (as some philosophers would say, they are not "first
level" predicates or predicables). Aquinas, however, seems to hold that
God is existence or being (esse) itself (ipsum esse subsistens), that this is what
God is, which might seem to suggest that Aquinas is somewhat askew
when it comes to the topic of being or existence in general. But is he? In
The Five Ways (1969) and Aquinas (1980), Kenny argued that he is. In the
present volume, and with reference to a large range of Aquinas's writings,
he continues to maintain this verdict. In his discussions of being, says
Kenny, Aquinas exhibits "extraordinary analytical ability as a philosopher"
(p.189) and "draws many acute distinctions" (p.viii). And yet, so Kenny
submits, it is not possible to extract "a consistent and coherent theory" of
being from Aquinas's many writings. Aquinas's teaching on being is, says
Kenny, "thoroughly confused" (p.v); though widely admired, it is, in fact,
"one of the least admirable of his contributions to philosophy" (p.viii).
Kenny defends these judgments by offering and defending the following
major conclusions: (1) Aquinas does not grasp the syntactic difference
between the verb "to be," as expressed by the existential quantifier, and various other senses of the verb that he highlights; (2) Aquinas's statements
about spiritual substances (e.g. angels) endorse an unacceptable Platonism
at odds with Aquinas's usual (Aristotelian) account of form; (3) Aquinas is
wrong to assert that God is ipsum esse subsistens since, as this teaching is
articulated in De Ente et Essentia 4,6, and elsewhere, it incorporates (by
implication) the ludicrous suggestion that the answer to the question "What
is God?" is "There is one." Kenny also suggests (d. pp.43 f. and 107 ff.) that
Aquinas's claim that God's essence is existence (esse) (a) entails that the
word "God" is equivalent to what would be expressed by the ill-formed
formula "For some x, x ... " (a quantifier with a bound variable attached to
no predicate), or (b) merely amounts to the assertion that the word "God"
means "something which cannot cease to exist, and has not begun to exist"
(d. pp.44 and 85). Kenny adds that Aquinas's teaching that God's essence is
esse can, from what he writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles (and elsewhere),
be taken as supposing that "est," in "Deus est," is a genuine first level predicate, which it cannot be, says Kenny, given what we have learned from
Frege (d. pp.87 and 105 f.). In the context of the Summa Contra Gentiles,
Kenny argues, (d. pp.106 f.), the thesis that God's essence is to exist is to be
read as asserting (unintelligibly) that God just is (period).
Kenny is wrong in his reading of De Ente et Essentia 4 and comparable
passages in Aquinas. In Kenny's translation (p.34), De Ente et Essentia 4
says: "I can understand what a human being is, or what a phoenix is, and
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yet be ignorant whether they have esse in the nature of things." As Kenny
interprets Aquinas, this sentence correctly maintains that knowing what a
noun means does not amount to knowing that there is anything in reality
corresponding to it (p.35). But, Kem1Y continues (pp.35 f.), Aquinas wrongly proceeds to conclude that God, therefore, differs from creatures since
knowing what the word 'God' means is the same as knowing that God
exists (i.e. that the answer to 'What is God?' is, absurdly, 'There is one').
There is, however, no reason to suppose that Aquinas is arguing along the
lines that Kenny suggests here either in De Ente et Essentia 4 or in other
comparable passages in his writings. Kenny's reading of Aquinas relies
heavily on De Ente et Essentia's phoenix example. Given that there is no
phoenix, Kenny reasons, we must presume Aquinas to be starting only
from the meaning of certain words (p.35 ff.; d. also p.62 and p.99). Yet we
have no reason to suppose that, in De Ente et Essentia, Aquinas took
"phoenix" to signify a purely imaginary object (many of his contemporaries certainly did not think of the phoenix in this way, and neither did
some major early Christian authors - e.g. Tertullian, St Ambrose, and
Clement of Rome). In the above quotation Aquinas links "phoenix" and
"human being." In his Commentary on the Sentences (2,3,1,1) he links
"phoenix" and "eclipse" (d. Aristotle on "eclipse" in Posterior Analytics
11,2). And, in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo (3,8), he cites the
phoenix as an example of something generated and perishable, even
though it is alone in its species. Pace Kenny, therefore, Aquinas's De Ente et
Essentia argument for there being a distinction of essence and existence in
creatures, but not in God, is most plausibly read as starting with actually
existing things (or things actually existing at some times) of which we can
provide real definitions (not just nominal ones). Aquinas's argument then
suggests that these definitions do not include "exists" as an element. In De
Ente et Essentia 4, and in passages comparable to it, Aquinas"s main point
seems to be that we can understand the natures of (the essences of) various
real things (all of them created by God) without simultaneously understanding that any particular one of them exists. Aquinas thinks that, for
example, your understanding of the nature which in fact is had by me does
not entail that there is any such person as me, which seems a plausible
position to maintain (unless you want to claim that I cannot but exist given
what I am by nature).
Kenny might reply that Aquinas still ends up ridiculously asserting or
implying that "There is one" is the proper answer to "What is God?". But
there is nothing in Aquinas's writings to support this interpretation of him
(unless we adopt what I take to be Kenny's misreading of De Ente et
Essentia 4). In general, Aquinas shows himself perfectly well able to distinguish between "Is there ... ?" and "What is ... ?" questions, and between the
sorts of answers appropriate to each, together with their implications. Of
course, Aquinas does think that God's essence (essentia) is to exist (esse). But
he never expounds this doctrine by saying that what God is can be adequately, or even intelligibly, expressed by "There is one." He usually says
(d. Summa Theologiae la, 3,4) that "God's essence is to exist" means that
there is no compositio (mixture) in God of essentia and esse, which, in turn,
means that God cannot owe his existence to anything distinct from himself
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(i.e. cannot be something created). As Aquinas often stresses, (d. Summa
Contra Gentiles 1,14, III,39, and the Introduction to Summa Theologiae Ia,3),
his claim that God's essence is existence is chiefly to be construed as a piece
of negative theology - as part of an account of what God cannot be, given
that "we cannot know what God is but only what he is not" (De deo scire
non possumus quid sit sed quid non sit). Kenny pays no attention to this
aspect of Aquinas's thinking, which ought to lead his readers to be dubious when it comes to his claims that "God," for Aquinas, amounts to "For
some x, x ...," or that Aquinas's "God's essence is existence" can be construed as teaching that the word "God" only signifies something (maybe
unreal) which cannot cease to exist and which never began to exist. For
Aquinas, "God" is the word we can use to refer to what makes the "difference" between there being something rather than nothing. On Aquinas's
account, and on the supposition that God has created the universe, "God
exists" (Deus est) is equivalent (among other things) to the claim that " _
creates," " _ is not created," " _ in no sense owes its existence to anything distinct from it" (all, surely, perfectly respectable first level predicates, by the way) are truly affirmable of something. And Aquinas's teaching that God's essence is existence most certainly does not ever amount
only to the claim that "God" is a word to be understood as meaning
"Something which cannot cease to exist and never began to exist."
Of course Aquinas thought that God, by nahue, lacks beginning and
end. But he thought so because he believed that whatever accounts for
there being something rather than nothing cannot come into being or perish. And, pace Kenny, he does not take this belief to mean that "God's
essence is to exist" is equivalent to "God just Is," where " _ is" is to be
understood as a first level predicate signifying what something is by
nature. According to Aquinas, we cannot describe something by saying
that it simply exists. "Every mode of existence," he explains, "is determined by some form" (quodlibet esse est secundum formam') (d. Summa
Theologiae la, 5,5 ad.3; d. la, 29,2 ad.5; la, 50,S, la, 75,6; De Principium
Naturae 1). Like Aristotle, Aquinas believed that there is no such class of
things as things which just are. For the most part, Aquinas's "Deus est"
means that what it takes to be divine is truly predicable of something. He
never explicitly asserts that "est," in "Deus est." tells us what God is. On
the contrary, he often says that we can know that "Deus est" is true without knowing what God is. For Aquinas, God is not an item in the universe.
He is not part of what we are concerned with if we ask, as Aquinas thinks
we should, 'How come something rather than nothing?'. As he puts it in
his Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (to which Kenny makes no
reference), God is extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias ("outside the realm of existents, as a
cause from which pours forth everything that exists in all its variant
forms"). Aquinas, of course, is not here saying that God does not exist. His
point is that God cannot be thought of as created, that God is not potentially non-existent. And that is what he is basically saying in the many texts in
which he contrasts God and creatures by insisting that, while it does not
belong to creatures to exist by nature, it does so belong to God. Kenny,
however, while sometimes hovering around it, seems to ignore this aspect
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of Aquinas's thinking. He never appears seriously to engage with what
Aquinas chiefly took to be the difference between God and creatures (a difference which, among other things, leads Aquinas to say that there is a distinction of essence and existence in creahlres but not in God).
As for Kenny's criticism of Aquinas concerning spiritual substances, all I
can say is that it is puzzling. Kenny's idea seems to be that, for Aquinas in
general (as for Aristotle), a form is what is captured by the predicate in a
sentence like uFelix is a cat." He writes: "Forms are forms of the entity
which is the subject of predication: Socrates' wisdom is what corresponds
to the predicate in the sentence 'Socrates is wise,' and Plato's humanity is
what corresponds to the predicate in the sentence 'Plato is human.' In the
same way, a pure form would be something that corresponded to a predicate in a sentence that had no subject; but this seems close to an absurdity.
What, we wonder, is the difference between the angelic pure forms that
Aquinas accepts and the Platonic Ideas or Forms that he rejects?" (p.30).
The difference for Aquinas is, presumably, that angels are subsisting things
with knowledge and the capacity to act, while Plato's forms are nothing
like this. It is obvious from so much that he writes that Aquinas would
give this answer to Kenny. It is equally obvious that Aquinas would say
that if there is something which subsists immaterially, then it can only be
thought of as nothing but form. Aquinas, indeed, generally takes "form" to
be what is flagged by u _ is wise" or " _ is human" in sentences like
"Socrates is wise" or "Plato is human." And, in doing so, he frequently
takes "form" to be a word to use when referring to what makes something
material to be what it is (whether substantially, as in "Plato is human," or
aCCidentally, as in "Plato is sleeping"). But what shall we say if asked to
talk about (while presuming the existence of) non-material subsisting subjects such as angels, given that we are seeking to express ourselves with
reference to the Aristotelian notion of form (as Aquinas, of course, was,
and as Kenny notes that he was)? We might be forgiven for suggesting
that such subjects (like God) cannot be material individuals sharing the
same form, but must, instead, be pure forms: forms existing, though not
materially.
One does not, qua Aristotelian, have to believe in angels in order to be
persuaded that Aquinas is not talking nonsense in what he says about
them as reported by Kenny. One does not even have to disagree with
Kenny's suggestion that Aquinas's talk about angels is "arcane" (p.32). All
one has to do (and Kenny makes precious little effort to do so) is to ask
what an intelligent Aristotelian might feel obliged to say about angels (a)
given the general intelligibility of Aristotelian talk about form, and (b)
given that angels actually exist. Such an Aristotelian would, indeed, be
trying to go beyond what Aristotle (no believer in angels) actually said
about anything (including being). But why should fans of Aristotle (or
anyone else, for that matter) be banned from trying to use words with
which they are familiar in unfamiliar ways (as Aquinas, with a debt to
Aristotle, was clearly trying to do in his discussions of angels, not to mention his discussions of God, in which he was also trying to make
Aristotelians take their thinking further)?
Aquinas on Being is an important book since it comes from one of the
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most gifted philosophers writing today, an expert on the history of philosophy, and someone who has been thinking and writing about Aquinas for
many years. So all serious students of Aquinas should read it and seek to
engage with its details (on many of which I have not been able to touch in
this review). My overall impression, however, is that, interesting though
its discussions of texts of Aquinas are, it has somehow managed to miss
the forest for the trees, and not to have caught what Aquinas is generally
driving at in what he has to say about God, being, and existence. Perhaps
Kenny's basic mistake is to assume that talk about God is easily assimilated
to talk about creatures. It has been suggested that, in trying to speak of
God and creatures (which is what, in effect, Aquinas is always trying to
do), Aquinas was working on the assumption that we can use words, not
only to say what they mean, but also to point beyond what we understand
them to mean (d. Herbert McCabe, "The Logic of Mysticism," Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 31, Cambridge, 1992). And, though
Kenny does not engage with it, there is something to be said for that thesis,
hard though it may be to do so given the complexities of medieval theories
of reference (of which Kenny says little) and given corresponding complexities in modem theories of reference (of which Kenny says something).

Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel, by

Rufus Black. Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 368. $90.00 (Cloth).
DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Oxford University
The perennial issue of moral realism is made all the more elusive by the
protean nature of both the adjective and the noun. As early as Plato's dialogues one finds compelling arguments to the effect that all allegedly
moral discourse is but a veiled reference to personal desires and merely
conventional values and interests. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, moral science was but a part of a general psychology of
human nature, with special attention to sentiment and the passions. Much
of the influential writing on the subject was in defense of rationalist or
emotivist or utilitarian conceptions of morality.
Within these inspired debates it is seldom easy to extract an ontologically precise version of the "realism" being affirmed or denied. Too often the
controversy is framed in terms of "objectivity" and "subjectivity," the contestants seemingly and comparably confident that the status of realism
must hang in the balance. It is as if, from the fact that the honeybee'S visual
sensitivity is greatest in the ultraviolet region of the spectrum, and that
ours reaches its peak in the region of 5,500 Angstroms, roses can't be real
after all! It should go without saying, of course, that ontological questions
regarding the reality of an entity are distinct from epistemological questions regarding the adequacy or accuracy with which such an entity is
apprehended. Thus, there may well be real moral properties, but they may
be beyond our epistemic resources. Or, there may well be real moral properties, but they may elude all powers of comprehension except those

